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This paper focuses on the economics of a cross-border transmission interconnector. The domestic spot
electricity price is modelled as a stochastic process with mean reversion and jumps; it also includes a
deterministic part that accounts for hourly and daily sasonalities along with non-working days. The two
domestic spot prices are assumed to be correlated. As an illustration of the approach, we consider the
particular case of the interconnector between Spain (an ‘electric island’) and France. Domestic prices are
first calibrated and then used for simulating the stochastic behavior of the price gap between the two
countries. In addition, the actual import/export behavior as a function of the price gap is captured by a
Tobit model fitted from observed data. This model is then combined with the simulated price gaps to
compute a multiple series of hourly prices and exports/imports of electricity through the interconnector.
Drawing on these simulations we derive the probability distributions of revenues and expenses from
exports and imports, and also some risk measures. According to our results, the economics of this
interconector depends on different domestic seasonalities (hourly and daily), the growing trend of the
price gap and some stochastic idiosyncrasies. They call for an expanded link.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Cross-border power interconnections bring about a number of
benefits for participating countries and beyond [1], among them: (i)
enhance security of electricity supply (SoS) by providing support
functions between interconnected electrical systems; (ii) ensure
the stability and frequency of the two systems; (iii) exploit price
differences through power imports and exports thus increasing
economic efficiency; (iv) harness renewable energy sources by
allowing the transmission of excess renewable generation; (v)
develop the Internal Energy Market in Europe.1
This paper falls within the literature about power transmission
expansion with a special focus on interconnector economics, i.e.. Abadie), jm.chamorro@ehu.
e for instance Ref. [32].
r Ltd. This is an open access articleitem (iii). A number of models have been proposed to address po-
wer trade based on price differentials.2 Many of them are applied to
European countries (whether looking backward or forward in
time), be it under general or partial equilibrium conditions. Typi-
cally, they are optimization models that aim to maximize social
welfare or minimize system costs, for instance. They usually
consider a single year (or fractions of it) with daily/hourly time
steps. Importantly, they tend to be deterministic; the authors ac-
count for risks and uncertainties by simulating the models under
several scenarios (e.g. without and with a particular expansion of
the transmission grid). Besides, the optimization process results in
a series of (daily/hourly) power prices, yet their properties are not
shown. Thus, whether those optimization-based prices display the
usual characteristics in actual power markets is all but impossible2 Full price convergence is not an objective as such: it would entail over-investing
in network infrastructures [33].
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Our paper introduces a novel approach that puts electricity
prices at the forefront of the analysis. It looks at actual wholesale
prices in two specific countries (domestic markets) with a common
interconnector. The paper proposes a stochastic model where
(correlated) domestic spot prices display seasonality, mean rever-
sion and jumps. The aim here is to evaluate a particular cross-
border interconnector from the viewpoint of revenues. Conse-
quently, we also consider actual flows of electricity in both di-
rections. Drawing on the latest price and quantity data publicly
available we simulate the revenues to the interconnector in the
near future. Hence we not only provide average estimates but
probability distributions (i.e. risk profiles) as well. We further
illustrate our approach by applying it to a singular case study; this is
the second contribution of our paper.
Right now, Spain is akin to an “electric island” because of its low
interconnection ratio of 2.8% in 2019 (computed as the sum of the
import capacities divided by the installed generation capacity). This
low rate is very far from the EU goal of 10% for 2020 and the
minimum of 15% for 2030; ENTSO-e [2]. The Spanish electricity
system is connected with France, Portugal, Morocco and, to a lesser
extent, Andorra. Anyway, the short AC interconnection with France
is very important because it gives access to the vast European
electricity market.3 The French interconnector has a commercial
exchange capacity of 2800 MW.4 After the commissioning of a new
project (crossing the Bay of Biscay) this capacity will increase up to
5000 MW; its commercial use is planned to start in 2024 or 2025
[3]. This way the interconnection ratio will rise to about 5%. Thus,
Spain will remain an “electric island” for decades to come. This
condition leaves it especially vulnerable to low-frequency, high-
impact events, whether of natural, accidental or malicious origins.
According to our results, Spanish exports would amount to V27
million on average over the three-year period 2020e22, while
imports from France would entail average expenses of V964
million. These figures allow justify substantial new investment
(taking [4]; and [5]; as benchmarks).5 One of the drivers behind this
result is the stronger upward trend of Spanish power price. As
expected, whenwe impose the restriction of no growth in domestic
prices the balance for Spain improves.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on the potential gains from enhanced cross-border interconnectors,
preferably (though not exclusively) with a focus on the EU. Then
Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, starting from the
stochastic model for domestic power price. Section 4 focuses on the
two countries involved in this paper; it provides background data
about domestic spot prices (at the hourly and daily time scales)
along with power exports and imports. The price model is cali-
brated n Section 5. Next in Section 6 we draw on the earlier
parameter estimates to simulate the price in each country (and the
ensuing price gap) over the period 2020e2022. On the other hand,
Section 7 estimates a model of power flows between France and
Spain. Cross-border flows and simulated prices allow simulate the
transmission income to the interconnector in Section 8. A sensi-
tivity analysis with respect to the growth rate of power prices is
undertaken in Section 9. Section 10 concludes.3 The interconnector project was first proposed in 1980 (followed by a second
proposal in 2003); it started operation 35 years later [34].
4 The net transfer capacity (NTC) typically sets the commercial (rather than the
physical) capacity between two countries.
5 The potential value of an interconnector is much higher. In addition to these
revenues from day-ahead coupling it comprises the benefits from intraday
coupling, shared balancing resources, avoided undesirable unscheduled flows, and
reduced curtailment. According to Ref. [5]; revenues from day-ahead arbitrage
make up around 25% of total value.
2
2. Literature survey
First, we proceed from a ‘macro’ to a ‘micro’ perspective: EU
nations, regions, and industry stakeholders (producers, consumers,
and transmission system operators). Then we consider some rea-
sons behind inefficient arbitrage transmission (i.e. flows in the
‘wrong’ economic direction) in pairs of neighbouring markets.
Abrell and Rausch [6] find considerable scope for two-way
cross-border trade in Europe (e.g. between Spain and France).-
Power price differentials are far from unidirectional. Further, very
frequently there are sizeable price gaps between countries with a
cross-border interconnection (e.g. France and Spain). The gaps can
certainly arise when transmission constraints are binding. And also
when they are not because of: (i) transmission losses and/or
ramping restrictions [7]; (ii) inability of the interconnector's owner
to take simultaneous long (i.e. purchasing) and short (i.e. selling)
positions in the two locations (because market liquidity in at least
one of them is too thin; [8].
G€oransson et al. [9] analyse the European power system at the
NUTS-2 level, which results in 50 regions. Their results for 2020
show an annual average marginal cost around 50 V/MWh in the
Spanish region ES2 and close to 30 V/MWh in the French one FR2.
This ‘congestion’ gap implies that the ‘marginal connection capacity
value’ over 8760 h amounts to some 173 Mill V per year (rendering
this connection one of the five AC interconnections with the
highest values). Further, these two regions are a case in so-called
‘all-hour congestion’.
Spiecker et al. [10] find utilization rates of the line connecting
France and Spain around 90% both with and without grid extension
in 2020 (about 2/3 of that rate corresponds to power flowing from
France to Spain, and 1/3 to reverse flow). These high rates suggest
that bottlenecks occur frequently. Under the expanded grid the
average of absolute price differences between these two countries
is cut in half.6 The share of variable wind infeed is significantly
higher in Spain than in France, which leads to more frequent re-
versals in the flow direction. Overall, France is one of the major
beneficiaries of new interconnectors; they have a positive impact
on producer surplus but a negative one on consumer surplus and
congestion rent. Pudjianto et al. [11] consider the period 2010 to
2050. They find that reinforcing the interconnection allows Spanish
consumers to access competitive offers from foreign producers,
which leads to lower power prices and producer surplus. Yet not all
producers suffer; for example, solar PV producers gain while wind
producers lose.7 Instead, French producers will meet a higher de-
mand, which results in an increase of power prices in France (to the
detriment of French consumers).
At this point, it is worth noting that electricity does not always
flow as price arbitrage would suggest.8 Clements et al. [12] find
instances of electricity flowing from Queensland to neighbouring
New South Wales despite the former having a higher price. They
show that these instances are due to nodal transmission constraints
in Queensland only (not to constraints across regional boundaries).
On the other hand, Bunn and Zachmann [13] show analytically that
a dominant generator in one location, under special circumstances,
may choose to export power (to a more competitive neighbouring
market) against the direction of efficient arbitrage. Further, as those6 The average of those differences between two regions over a year indicates the
welfare effect of a marginal line investment.
7 This can be related to the different levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of these
technologies; Abadie and [35].
8 Under some circumstances, a flow in the ‘wrong economic direction’ may be
socially beneficial if its welfare economic cost is smaller than the welfare economic
benefit of the congestion relieved by such a flow; [33].
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177special circumstances do apply in the case of the Anglo-French
Interconnector, they provide evidence that such flow reversions
do occur in reality.
The above papers focus on pairs of neighbouring countries for
the most part, and we follow suit. Nonetheless, this is a partial
perspective. In an AC network, physical electricity flows are hard to
control and cannot be directed. Therefore, in highly meshed
transmission networks (e.g. continental Europe) the directly-
connected countries are not the only players in determining
cross-border flows. Changes in spatial generation/load patterns in
non-neighbouring countries reverberate beyond national borders
and impact other regions and/or cross-border interconnections in
the network. We do not consider these effects beyond immediate
neighbours9; ignoring general equilibrium/network effects is not so
much of a problem when addressing links to isolated systems like
Spain [14]. Further, this is not only a technical issue. As Kunz [15]
points out, the identification of flow patterns has important effects
on the available cross-border capacity and hence on electricity spot
markets. We leave this issue aside.3. Theoretical framework
Our ultimate goal is to simulate the transmission income to the
interconnector in the near future (the three-year period
2020e2022). We first introduce a stochastic model of power prices.
This model is then to be estimated with publicly available data.
Parameter estimates allow simulate power prices in the two
countries. Next, it is necessary to estimate a model of power
transmission along the interconnector. However, cross-border
flows are subject to some constraints; this leads to ‘censoring’
several observations, which in turn calls for abandoning the linear
regression model and replacing it with a so-called Tobit model.
Upon its estimation (with STATA), it is finally possible to simulate
power prices along with flows and derive simulated revenues (with
MATLAB).3.1. A stochastic model of electricity prices
As Weron [16] points out, the European convention is to refer to
the day-ahead electricity price as the ‘spot price’. We use spot
prices because of their greater informational content and liquidity.
Besides, they reflect market fundamentals (as opposed to expecta-
tions about future market fundamentals, which are reflected in the
prices of futures and forward contracts on electricity); Hirth [17].
Several approaches have been developed for analyzing and
predicting electricity prices; see Weron [16]. So-called reduced-
form (quantitative, stochastic) models characterize the statistical
properties of power prices over time. We refer in particular to
Escribano et al. [18]; Lucía and Schwartz [19]; Seifert and Uhrig-
Homburg [20]; and Villaplana [21]. We use a modified version of
the stochastic model inMathWorks [22] to account for the effects of
non-working days. Specifically, we describe the (natural logarithm
of) daily spot price pt in a given country i ¼ {S (Spain), F (France)},





¼ f iðtÞ þ Xit (1)
The first part, f iðtÞ, is deterministic. It includes annual and semi-
annual seasonalities (through sine and cosine functions), a trend
(t), and a dummy variable (Dit) for weekends and public holidays
(we consider only official national holidays, not regional ones):9 [36] adopt this broader view but aim at a different goal.
3
Dit ¼ 1 on weekends and non-working days, Dit ¼ 0 otherwise. It
also includes a constant (bi7) along with 24 parameters (b
i
j) that
correspond to the hourly seasonality (Hj7;t ; j ¼ 8;…31) in each
country:
f iðtÞ¼bi1sinð2ptÞþbi2cosð2ptÞþbi3sinð4ptÞþbi4cosð4ptÞ




































Specifically, Equations (3) and (4) are Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU)
mean-reverting processes with jumps. They include three terms on
the right hand; the first one is a function of Xit , while the other two
are stochastic. Leaving the latter aside for a moment, the equation







(log) stochastic part of the electricity price in country i tends to-
ward ai=ki in the long term, with a reversion speed ki. If Xit falls
below its long-run quilibriumvalue the parenthesis will be positive,
which induces an increase in its value (dXit >0); and conversely: if
Xit rises above a
i=ki the parenthesis will be negative, pushing Xit
downwards (dXit <0). In sum, when X
i
t departs from its long-term
equilibrium (due to the impact of stochastic shocks, namely OU
and jumps), the first term tends to restore the equilibrium (always
subject to shocks). Besides, the higher the speed of reversion ki, the
sooner Xit approaches its equlibrium value. Now, the second term
generates a random behaviour without jumps. The volatility of the
mean-reverting process is si; dWit is the increment to a standard
Wiener process. The third term is a Poisson process with intensity li
(the mean rate of event occurrence); if time is measured in years
then li jumps are expected per year. The jump size is normally




j is a Poisson
process such that dqij ¼ 1 with probability lidt, and dqij ¼ 0 with
probability 1 lidt. We assume that dWit and dqij are independent.
Note that Equations (3) and (4) allow negative values (the loga-
rithm of some low electricity prices can be negative).
On the other hand, sometimes both French and Spanish prices
can move stochastically for common reasons. Equation (5) shows
that these processes are correlated as measured by r. In this regard,
the higher the price correlation, the lower the ability to benefit
from the price gap between countries and hence from the
interconnector.3.2. Calibration of the price model
Calibrating the above jump-diffusion model is related to the10 This second part can be interpreted as a special case of the general stochastic
differential equation for the increment of the (deseasonalized and detrended) spot
electricity price in Ref. [16].
Table 1
Hourly prices and power flows: Descriptive statistics (2016e2019).
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Skewness Excess Kurtosis Percentile 5% Percentile 95%
Electricity Price Spain (V/MWh) 49.21 0.03 101.99 14.35 0.45 0.77 23.04 70.67
Electricity Price France (V/MWh) 42.84 31.82 874.01 20.32 6.64 222.74 17.27 74.74
Price gap Spain-France (V/MWh) 6.38 810.96 68.50 14.75 14.83 741.26 11.07 25.45
Exports (Spain- > France) (MWh) 399.74 0.00 3632.08 774.97 1.91 2.25 0.10 2286.46
Imports (France- > Spain) (MWh) 1597.84 0.00 3755.34 1053.14 0.26 1.21 0.00 3091.84
France net imports-exports (MWh) 1198.10 3632.08 3636.90 1692.51 0.97 0.27 2250.88 3057.39
France total imports þ exports (MWh) 1997.58 127.75 4291.60 744.84 0.18 0.64 698.41 3153.28
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177more general problem of estimating the parameters of continuous-
time jump processes from discretely sampled data; Cont and
Tankov [23] offer an excellent review. Estimation procedures that
involve the characteristic function, such as maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation, are of particular interest from the viewpoint of
statistical soundness. Below we will proceed in two steps. First we
address the deterministic part of the price processes, and then their
stochastic part. We stick with daily power prices in both countries.3.3. Monte Carlo simulation of power prices
We simulate the stochastic part of the log prices by means of an














where Dqij ¼ 1 with probability l
iDt, and Dqij ¼ 0 with probability
1 liDt (here Dt ¼ 1=365). The Poisson behaviour is simulated
with random numbers sampled from a binary distribution with
jump probability liDt. When there is a jump its size is mij þ sijxij,
which is simulated with random numbers xij from independent
N(0,1) samples. This amounts to extracting the jump size from a
normal distribution Nðmij;sijÞ.
Regarding the OU component, we generate random samples of
correlated daily log prices for France according to this scheme:





Here vS denotes samples of the third term in Equation (6) for
Spain, while vF does so for France. Instead, xS and xF are two in-
dependent N(0; 1) samples. r is the correlation coefficient between
the two stochastic parts, XSt and X
F
t .11 ACER (2020, Table 5) shows the average gap across the Pyrenees in 2016 (2.9
V/MWh), 2017 (7.3), 2018 (7.1), and 2019 (8.2). This price differential is not the
same as the ‘marginal value of transmission capacity’ in Spiecker et al. (2017),
which corresponds to the sum (or average) of absolute price differences between
two regions over a year. In our sample period, the average absolute gap on this
interconnector has been 9.78 V/MWh. As a reference, it was 11 V/MWh across the
England-France interconnector for 2011e12; [14]. In the case of Spain-France, ACER
(2020) provides yearly estimates in 2016 (8 V/MWh), 2017 (10.2), 2018 (10.8), and
2019 (10.1).
12 Just to put these figures into context [8], analyse five pairs of European
neighbouring countries. Absolute average hourly spreads range between 0.27
V/MWh and 15.56 V/MWh, with standard deviations from 17.76 to 40.75. The
maximum spread is 915 V/MWh (between The Netherlands and UK), and the
minimum spread is 901 V/MWh (between Germany and the Netherlands), both
during peak hours.3.4. Estimation of power flows along the interconnector
Drawing on historical hourly data (2016e2019, Table 1) we as-
sume a maximum transmission capacity of 3500 MWh. Therefore,
in our computations below, exports and imports are left-censored
(i.e. censored from below) at a value of zero, and right-censored
(i.e. censored from above) at 3500 MWh. Censoring’ means that
we observe the independent variables for all cases, but the
dependent variable is observed only over a restricted range of
values (not its entire range). Censoring does not change the sample,
but involves loss of information in a systematic way. In our case,
left-censored data are aggregated and included as 0s, and right-
censored ones as 3,500s. Consequently, the standard Linear
Regression Model provides inconsistent estimates of the parame-
ters. Instead, the Tobit model provides consistent estimates
(assuming, as usual, that the errors are normal and homoscedastic);
it uses all of the information, including information about the4
censoring. Thus, ordinary least squares (OLS) must be replaced by
ML estimation; see Long [24].4. Data
Our data set includes daily and hourly information on domestic
electricity spot prices (V/MWh) alongwith imports/exports (MWh)
between Spain and France; it can be downloaded from the e-sios
database (https://www.esios.ree.es/). The sample period is
2016e2019, i.e. four years. In particular, we have 1461 daily prices
and 35,064 hourly prices. During this period the commercial
interconnection capacity remained constant at 2800 MW.
The upper block in Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of hourly
power prices. Spanish prices are 6.38 V/MWh higher than the
French ones on average (¼ 49.21e42.84)11; the latter are more
volatile than the former (20.32 V/MWh vs 14.35). Besides, the price
gap between Spain and France shows negative skewness (14.83),
i.e. the left tail of the distribution is longer/fatter than the right one
(in other words, the probability mass is concentrated on the right of
the distribution). It also displays positive excess kurtosis (741.26),
that is, extreme values are, well, more extreme than in a Normal
distribution (whose kurtosis is 3); this is confirmed by the
maximum (68.50), minimum (810.96), and the 5% and 95% per-
centiles (11.07 and 25.45, respectively).12 Sizeable positive or
negative price gaps contribute positively to the economic value of
the interconnection with France.
The lower block provides information about actual power flows.
For instance, maximum exports from Spain to France reach
3632.08 MWh, and 3755.34 the other way round. Thus, the
maximum capacity of the interconnector is somewhat higher than
3500 MW, above its commercial capacity (2800 MW as already
stated), because of an additional capacity devoted to SoS. Anyway,
commercial capacity is not exactly constant (see Figure A4); it is
periodically reset by Red Electrica de Espa~na (REE, the Spanish
transmission system operator). During the sample period the net
balance shows electricity flowing from France to Spain (at a rate of
1597.84e399.74 ¼ 1198.10 MWh on average).
Table 2 shows some hourly price and quantity correlations. The
Table 2
Hourly prices and power flows: Correlation coefficients (2016e2019).
Electricity Price Spain Electricity Price France Price gap Spain-France Exports (Spain- > France) Imports (France- > Spain)
Electricity Price Spain 1.0000
Electricity Price France 0.6878 1.0000
Price gap Spain-France 0.0251 0.7084 1.0000
Exports (Spain- > France) 0.0104 0.3747 0.5261 1.0000
Imports (France- > Spain) 0.0874 0.2751 0.4639 0.7075 1.0000
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177correlation between Spanish and French prices is 0.6878.13 As ex-
pected, Spanish imports from France are positively correlated with
the price gap between these countries (0.4639). At the same time,
Spanish exports to France are negatively correlated with the price
gap (0.5261).14 Thus, the price gap is a major driver of power flow
along the interconnection with France.
Now, Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of daily electricity
prices. The average price gap with France remains similar as with
hourly prices (6.47 V/MWh). Not surprisingly, price gap volatility
(10.79 V/MWh) is lower thanwith hourly ones (14.75). Daily prices
also show positive excess kurtosis. The average daily net import
from France is 28,754.37 MWh.
As seen in Table 4, the correlation between Spanish and French
daily prices (0.7549) is a bit higher than with hourly prices; this
lower hourly correlation can be explained by different seasonality
in these countries (e.g. different hourly habits in consumer
behaviour). The correlation between the price gap and power flows
is 0.6709 for Spanish imports and 0.7500 for exports to France,
both stronger than with hourly prices.
Fig. 1 displays daily prices in both countries. Most of the time
French prices are cheaper than Spanish ones. Besides, in both
countries price volatility is high. In Spain, the minimum price is
lower than the average less three times the standard deviation
(1.94 < 49.21e3  12.86 ¼ 10.63), while the maximum price in
France is higher than the average plus five times the volatility
(125.67 > 42.83 þ 5  16.31 ¼ 124.38). Usually, whenever there is
an abnormal peak (or the opposite) the starting price is more or less
normal and then returns toward a normal level in the following
day.
Fig. 2 shows the daily price gap between these countries. There
is a seasonal pattern, with wider gaps in the summer and narrower
ones inwinter. Further information extracted from our sample data
is available in Appendix A.
5. Estimation of the price model
Regarding the first seven parameters of the deterministic part,
from Equation (2) and applying OLS we derive the estimates in
Table 5. Some estimates are relevant for the value of the deter-
ministic component. bi1 and b
i
2 in particular reveal a greater impact
of annual seasonality for France. Others, such as bS3, have little
influence.The estimates of the trend coefficients, bS5 ¼ 0.0728 and
bF5 ¼ 0:0454, suggest that the price gap has been widening over13 [29] estimate a correlation of 0.6524 based on 81 monthly price observations
between 2004 and 2011. Both figures are similar to the correlation (0.67) between
hourly prices in France and the UK from November 2001 through June 2009 found
by Ref. [8].
14 These signs are consistent with results in Ref. [36]. Drawing on monthly data for
29 European countries they find that power price (as an explanatory variable of net
exports) is statistically significant in most of their specifications; it has a negative
impact, i.e. decreasing domestic prices make net exports more appealing. Inter-
estingly for our case, they also find that, on average, neighbouring countries (Spain)
of “large” countries (France) are positive net importers (admittedly, at low orders of
magnitude).
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time. This in turn translates into an increase in the economic value
of the interconnection.
We have also derived numerical estimates of the parameters
involved in hourly seasonality: bi8, …, b
i
32, with i ¼ S, F. For this
purpose we calculate the difference between the (log) price in each
hour of a day and the (log) price in that day. Thus, since the sample
comprises 1461 days, we have 1461 differences for each of the 24 h.
The average of those 1461 differences for, say, the first hour of the
day, is the seasonality for that hour. The process is repeated for each
of the remaining hours and separately for France and Spain. Thus,
the numbers in Table 6 are to be interpreted with respect to the
daily price (in a given day): a positive (respectively, negative) figure
means an hourly price above (resp. below) the overall daily price
(note that we use log prices).
As can be seen in Fig. 3, hourly seasonality shows wider varia-
tion in France, with peaks and troughs further away from each
other than in Spain. Maximumhourly prices tend to happen around
20:00 in France and 22:00 in Spain; theminimumprices are usually
reached about 5:00 in both countries. In France below-average
prices are found from 1:00 till 7:00; in Spain they run until 8:00.
These different hourly patterns can impact both export and import
power flows between the two countries.
Upon estimation of f iðtÞ we can break the price process into its
two components: deterministic and stochastic. The upper panel in
Fig. 4 shows the (natural logarithm of) power price in Spain, lnðpSt Þ,
alongside its deterministic part, f SðtÞ. The lower panel, instead,
displays lnðpSt Þ with f SðtÞ removed, i.e. the stochastic part, XSt .
Similarly for France, the upper panel in Fig. 5 shows lnðpFt Þ,
alongside f FðtÞ. Instead, the lower panel displays the stochastic
component, XFt .
Concerning the stochastic part of the (natural logarithm of)
power prices, Xit , we follow maximum likelihood estimation (see
Appendix B) and obtain the parameter estimates in Table 7. On the
other hand, the correlation coefficient between XSt and X
F
t is r ¼
0:6570. This is somewhat different from the one obtained with
daily prices (0.7549), because it refers only to the stochastic parts of
the (log) prices.
In Spain an average of 32.15 jumps are expected per year and
37.88 in France; thus, the daily (Dt ¼ 1=365) jump probabilities are
lidt ¼ 0.0881 and 0.1038, respectively. Jumps in Spain follow a
normal distribution NðmSj ;sSj Þ ¼ Nð-0.1347; 0.5462). In France they
behave according to Nð-0.0973, 0.4431); this suggests negative, less
pronounced, and less volatile jumps. However, in the absence of
jumps, the log price in France is more volatile (2.4374) and tends to
return faster (67.4638) to its long-term equilibrium value.
6. Monte Carlo simulation of power prices
Our numerical application of the scheme in Equation (7) gen-
erates 10,000 correlated random samples with r ¼ 0.6574, very
close to the estimated value of 0.6570. We run 10,000 simulations
for three years (2020, 2021 and 2022), i.e. 1096 days, under the real-
world probability measure.
Table 3
Daily prices and power flows: Descriptive statistics (2016e2019).
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
Deviation
Skewness Excess Kurtosis Percentile 5% Percentile 95%
Electricity Price Spain (V/MWh) 49.21 1.94 91.88 12.86 0.52 0.87 25.41 68.01
Electricity Price France (V/MWh) 42.83 2.66 125.67 16.31 0.99 1.98 20.86 70.89
Price gap Spain-France (V/MWh) 6.47 68.04 50.87 10.79 0.99 5.41 9.53 21.90
Exports (Spain- > France) (MWh) 9593.75 0.00 71,261.77 15,472.64 1.80 2.22 2.60 47,360.50
Imports (France- > Spain) (MWh) 38,348.12 0.00 78,997.68 21,106.50 0.23 0.99 1369.82 70,036.63
France net imports-exports (MWh) 28,754.37 70,673.92 78,994.02 34,564.26 0.95 0.08 44,301.98 69,326.31
France total imports þ exports (MWh) 47,941.86 15,596.54 81,699.32 13,231.98 0.19 0.63 27,997.47 71,082.50
Table 4
Daily prices and power flows: Correlation coefficients (2016e2019).
Electricity Price Spain Electricity Price France Price gap Spain-France Exports (Spain- > France) Imports (France- > Spain)
Electricity Price Spain 1.0000
Electricity Price France 0.7549 1.0000
Price gap Spain-France 0.0465 0.6171 1.0000
Exports (Spain- > France) 0.0605 0.4457 0.7500 1.0000
Imports (France- > Spain) 0.1420 0.3266 0.6709 0.7805 1.0000
Fig. 1. Daily spot electricity prices in France and Spain, 2016e2019.
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177Starting with Spain, initially we simulate the stochastic daily
part, XSt using Equation (7). In a second step we add the deter-
ministic daily part, f SðtÞ, according to Equation (1), with the annual
and semi-annual seasonalities, trend, effects of weekend and non-
working days, and a constant. Finally, we transform the log prices
into absolute prices (in V/MWh). Fig. 6 shows the historical path of
the daily log price over 2016e2019 along with a simulated path for
2020e2022 and the deterministic part alone.
As before, we add the deterministic part to XFt and finally come
up with simulated paths of daily power prices for France. Thus, we
have 10,000 simulated paths of future daily prices in each country.
Hence we can compute 10,000 daily price gaps between these
countries for every single day over the period 2020e2022. Fig. 7
displays the average of 10,000 daily gaps in any day during this
period. The gap shows a seasonal behaviour; the same applies to
the observed price gap (see Fig. 2).6
Next, we transform the simulated daily log price series, lnðpitÞ,
into hourly series by applying the hourly seasonality coefficients
(Table 6) to each of the former series (thus obtaining 24 log prices
for each day); the log prices are further translated into absolute
prices (V/MWh). Finally, we compute the hourly price gaps over
2020e22, namely 24  (366 þ 365þ365) ¼ 26,304 hourly gaps for
each of our 10,000 simulations, i.e. 10,000 hourly paths of 26,304
values each. Fig. 8 shows the resulting probability distribution. The
10% percentile is 13.63 V/MWh while the 90% percentile is 39.19
V/MWh. The average is 13.65 and the median a bit higher, namely
13.88 V/MWh. The distribution displays negative skewness.7. Power flows along the Spain-France interconnector
Based on the 35,064 hourly observations for Spain, we estimate
a Tobit model for exports to France and another one for imports
Fig. 2. Daily power price gap between Spain and France, 2016e2019.
Table 5
Parameter estimates of price processes (2016e2019, daily data): deterministic part
f iðtÞ, as shown in Eq. (2).















L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177from France. Tables 8 and 9 show the results from STATA,
respectively.
Regarding Spanish exports, the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square
with p-value ¼ 0.0000 informs us that the Tobit model is signifi-
cantly better than an empty model. The coefficients are statistically
significant. The/sigma statistic (671.7724) is the estimated standard
error of the regression. With the numerical estimate of the priceTable 6
Parameter estimates of price processes (2016e2019, daily data): deterministic part f iðtÞ,
Spain
Hour bSh Hour b
S
h
1:00 0.0237 13:00 0.0471
2:00 0.1154 14:00 0.0401
3:00 0.1838 15:00 0.0084
4:00 0.2274 16:00 0.0324
5:00 0.2463 17:00 0.0438
6:00 0.2075 18:00 0.0090
7:00 0.1163 19:00 0.0385
8:00 0.0177 20:00 0.0887
9:00 0.0334 21:00 0.1206
10:00 0.0693 22:00 0.1324
11:00 0.0713 23:00 0.0872
12:00 0.0575 24:00 0.0153
7
gap coefficient (28.06604) we simulate power exports to France
under uncertainty: Exports (S/F) ¼ 564.46e28.06  simulated
gap þ N(0; 671.77).
As for Spanish imports, again the LR tells us that the Tobit model
is significantly better than an empty model. The coefficients are
statistically different from zero. The estimated standard error of the
regression in this case is 958.8273. We use the gap coefficient
(53.39729) to simulate power imports from France under
uncertainty.
8. Simulated transmission income to the interconnector
Power flows from one country to the other give rise to a mon-
etary income (congestion rent) the size of which depends on the
price gap between them. At the same time, we assume trans-
mission costs of 5 V/MWh (as in Ref. [25]; or [8]. Thus, sometimes
the net income can be negative because of this transmission cost.
Nonetheless, it can also be negative because there can be exports
when the gap price is positive (i.e. power flows from Spain to France
despite its higher price in Spain), the same way that there can be
imports when the gap is negative (that is, Spain purchases powerhourly seasonality in Eq. (2).
France
Hour bFh Hour b
F
h
1:00 0.0906 13:00 0.0551
2:00 0.1990 14:00 0.0056
3:00 0.2747 15:00 0.0675
4:00 0.3868 16:00 0.0941
5:00 0.4277 17:00 0.0735
6:00 0.3143 18:00 0.0455
7:00 0.1271 19:00 0.1802
8:00 0.0432 20:00 0.2281
9:00 0.1187 21:00 0.1640
10:00 0.1315 22:00 0.0804
11:00 0.1014 23:00 0.0884
12:00 0.0861 24:00 0.0132
Fig. 3. Log price of electricity in France and Spain (2016e2019, hourly data): hourly seasonality (the average of the difference between the log price in each hour of a day and the log
price in that day).
Fig. 4. Log electricity price in Spain (2016e2019, daily data): deterministic and stochastic parts.
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177from France in spite of higher prices there). This behaviour ema-
nates from the actual behaviour reflected in the Tobit model
(excluded 1073 þ 3433 negative observations; the 96 observations
above 3500 are censored). Fig. 9 displays the probability distribu-
tion of cumulative revenues and expenses (from the viewpoint of8
Spain) over the simulation horizon.
Table 10 shows a few basic descriptive statistics of the 3-year
transmission income. Power exports generate an average of V27
million over 2020-22 while imports entail expenses of V964
million on average during the same period. The value of bilateral
Fig. 5. Log electricity price in France (2016e2019, daily data): deterministic and stochastic parts.
Table 7
Parameter estimates of price processes (2016e2019, daily data): stochastic part Xit , Eqs. (3) and (4).
Parameter Spain France
Value 95% confidence interval Value 95% confidence interval
a 4.3161 2.2018e6.4304 3.7019 0.8469e6.5568
k 56.3486 46.2128e66.4844 67.4638 56.9641e77.9635
mj 0.1347 0.2378e0.0316 0.0973 0.1842e0.0105
s 1.8261 1.7266e1.9205 2.4374 2.2788e2.5862
sj 0.5462 0.4547e0.6244 0.4431 0.357e0.515
l 32.1534 23.7531e40.5537 37.8801 24.1242e51.636
Fig. 6. Actual daily log price of electricity in Spain (2016e2019) and a simulated stochastic path (2020e2022).
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9
Fig. 7. Average of simulated daily price gaps between Spain and France (2020e2022).
Fig. 8. Histogram of simulated hourly price gaps between Spain and France (2020e2022).
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177trade over this period thus amounts to V991 million. This implies
an average ofV330.3 million per year for a capacity of 3500 MW, or
about V94 million/GWyr. Broadly comparable analyses are sparse.
Meeus [26] addresses the 600 MWKontek HVDC link between East
Denmark and Germany under different market-coupling settings
(from no coupling to one-way coupling, through approximate
coupling).15 The estimated welfare gain from coupling on that line15 ‘Coupling’ means that wholesale electricity prices should be equalized across
boundaries unless the interconnector is constrained (in which case, prices can
diverge but the interconnector should be fully utilized); [14].
10is aboutV17million/GWyr. On the other hand, SEM Committee [25]
analyses the two interconnectors between Great Britain and the
island of Ireland. In this case, the social welfare gain is estimated at
V32 million/GWyr. On the other hand, ACER [4] looks at price dif-
ferences across a sample of cross-border links. Considering the top
15 interconnectors, the average day-ahead arbitrage benefits for a
1000 MW link amount to V68 million/yr, able to justify substantial
new investment [5]; drawing on this result, for a 3500 MW link the
revenue would rise to V238 million/yr. Looking far into the future,
in the year 2050 the congestion rent from the interconnector jumps
from 1242 MV with low interconnection capacity (1400 MW) to
2556 MV with high interconnection capacity (21,500 MW);
Table 8
Tobit regression: Power flows from Spain to France (hourly data, 2016e2019).
Number of obs ¼ 35,064
LR chi2(1) ¼ 11,244.66
Prob > chi2 ¼ 0.0000
Log likelihood ¼ 270,381.02 Pseudo R2 ¼ 0.0204
Export Coefficient Std. Err. T P>|t| [ 95% Interval ]
Price gap 28.06604 0.2437418 115.15 0.000 28.54378 27.5883
Constant 564.4652 3.919129 144.03 0.000 556.7836 572.1468
/sigma 671.7724 2.58251 666.7106 676.8342
1073 left-censored observations with exports to France ¼ 0.
33,988 uncensored observations.
3 right-censored obs. with exports >3,500 MWh
Table 9
Tobit regression: Power flows from France to Spain (hourly data, 2016e2019).
Number of obs ¼ 35,064
LR chi2(1) ¼ 13,072.98
Prob > chi2 ¼ 0.0000
Log likelihood ¼ 264,781.42 Pseudo R2 ¼ 0.0241
Import Coefficient Std. Err. T P>|t| [ 95% Interval ]
Gap Price 53.39729 0.4412728 121.01 0.000 52.53238 54.2622
Constant 1194.734 6.056656 197.26 0.000 1182.863 1206.606
/sigma 958.8273 3.895733 951.1916 966.4631
3433 left-censored observation with imports from France ¼ 0.
31,538 uncensored observations.
93 right-censored obs. with imports >3500 MWh
Fig. 9. Histogram of the simulated transmission income to the interconnector (2020e2022).
Table 10
Simulated 3-year income (million V) from cross-border power flows.
10% percentile Average Median 90% percentile
Exports (S/F) 32 27 20 94
Imports (F/S) 773 964 957 1166
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177Pudjianto et al. [11].11In Europe, cross-border transmission investment projects are
usually taken on the basis of commercial profitability, following a
regulatory test that confirms positive contribution to social wel-
fare; Konstantelos et al. [27]. To the extent that high transmission
income is an indication of capacity constraint, the figures in
Table 10 raise the business case for a reinforcement project
Table 11
Parameter estimates of price processes (2016e2019, daily data): zero growth (bi5 ¼
0).
Parameter Spain (i ¼ S) France (i ¼ F)
bi1
0.1520 (0.1288) 0.1741 (0.1597)
bi2
0.0352 (0.0350) 0.2082 (0.2081)
bi3
0.0122 (0.0007) 0.0401 (0.0329)
bi4




0.1770 (0.1770) 0.3230 (0.3233)
bi7
3.9024 (3.7569) 3.7846 (3.6939)
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177between the two systems.16 Further, as Konstantelos et al. [28]
point out, the increasing penetration of variable renewable energy
sources is noticeably expanding cross-border arbitrage
opportunities.
In addition to the direct impacts in terms of expenses and rev-
enues there can also be other indirect effects from increased cross-
border competition. Newbery et al. [14] mention some of them:
pressure to reduce costs, innovate, enhanced market liquidity,
improved sustainability (if low-carbon power displaces more
polluting sources), greater SoS, etc.9. Sensitivity analysis
As shown in Equation (2), the (log) power price in each country
depends on calendar time. Indeed, from our sample period
2016e2019 we estimated bS5 ¼ 0.0728 and bF5 ¼ 0.0454; see Table 5.
These figures imply that not only domestic prices grow over time
but the price gap as well, since bS5 >b
F
5. Now, however, we impose
zero growth, i.e. we adopt bS5 ¼ bF5 ¼ 0. Under this assumption, the
remainder estimates of parameters change as shown in Table 11
(earlier figures in parenthesis for convenience). None of the
changes is dramatic; a fraction of the impact previously attributed
to the time trend shows up now through other (mainly seasonal)
parameters.
On the other hand, the correlation coefficient between XSt and X
F
t
is also slightly different: r ¼ 0:6687 (instead of 0.6570 earlier).
From Equation (6) this coefficient affects the correlated samples to
use in the simulation. Upon generating 10,000 samples the
resulting correlation is 0.6690, almost the same as the estimated
value 0.6687.
As seen in Fig.10, setting the two price trends equal (¼ 0) pushes
the probabilistic mass to the left, thus reducing the average price
gap. This goes in hand with a slight increase in its frequency.
At the same time, there is no change in the results from the Tobit
regression model. Note that we are just estimating the model with
exactly the same sample data (2016e2019) as before. However, the
assumption of no price growth over time does impact the income to
be collected from the cross-border transmission line. Table 12
displays some basic descriptive statistics.17 For convenience, we
also show the previous values.16 Note that, as Spiecker et al. (2017) point out, the optimal transmission capacity
is not the one that avoids all welfare losses of congestion, since these must be set
against the investment cost of newly built transmission lines (which we leave
aside). Similarly, we are overlooking here that, according to Ref. [37]; the current
interconnector capacities are insufficient to prevent large national utilities from
exercising market power without proper regulation, which can impact their
fondness for new lines.
17 The histograms of income from power exports/imports are available from the
authors upon request.
12Now, on average power exports generate up to V40 million over
2020e22 (a 48.15% increase). Imports remain much higher as
before, and imply average expenses of V462 million in the same
period (a 52.07% decrease). The overall pattern is clear: under the
zero-growth assumption, Spain exports more power to France and
imports less from its neighbour. In view of our earlier estimates
(bS5¼0.0728, bF5 ¼ 0.0454) this is not surprising: the upward trend of
power price is stronger in Spain than in France. By suppressing this
trend, Spain comparatively improves its competitiveness. This
naturally leads to exporting more and importing less.10. Conclusions
This paper falls within the literature on power transmission
expansion in general and interconnector economics in particular.
The focus here is power trade based on price differentials. Standard
approaches draw on (deterministic) optimization models where
the electricity price is one of the variables determined in the pro-
cess (i.e. it is endogenous). In those papers the power price is hardly
the main focus; typically there is nothing said about the extent to
which the resulting price series display the observed dynamics of
electricity price in actual markets.
Now, the paper at hand introduces a new approach for quanti-
fying the potential revenue to a cross-border interconnector. Our
approach brings the (spot) price to the forefront of the analysis
while accounting for its usual properties in practice: uncertainty,
seasonality, mean reversion, jumps, and correlation across coun-
tries. We use the price model along with an econometric model of
power exports and imports to assess the economics of an
interconnector.
The second contribution of our paper is an empirical application
to a singular cross-border interconnector. The Iberian peninsula
shows relative electrical insularity within Europe. Spain in partic-
ular has an interconnection ratio (2.8% in 2019) that is far lower
than the EU minimum goal (10% for 2020 and 15% for 2030). The
interconnection with France is thus extremely important, since it
gives access to the vast European power market. A new project,
already under way, is expected to start operation in 2024 or 2025.
Upon completion, it will raise Spain's interconnection ratio to about
5%, still well below the stated EU minimum goals.
We find that Spanish exports amount to V27 million on average
over the three-year period 2020e22; imports from France entail
average expenses of V964 million. Bilateral trade over this period,
V991 million, implies V330.3 million on average per year for a
capacity of 3500MW, i.e. aboutV94million/GWyr. These values are
much higher than others found in the literature. Thus, Meeus [26]
estimates the social welfare gain from coupling on a link between
East Denmark and Germany of about V17 million/GWyr. In the case
of the two interconnectors between Great Britain and the island of
Ireland, that gain is estimated at V32 million/GWyr; SEM Com-
mittee [25]. Drawing on the top 15 interconnectors in ACER [4]; for
a 3500 MW link the revenue would rise to V238 million/yr. On the
other hand, our sensitivity analysis shows that, when we impose
the restriction of no growth in domestic power prices, the trade
balance for Spain improves, since the upward trend in price is
stronger in Spain than in France. These results are potentially useful
for power producers, traders, and consumers. They are also useful
for policy makers, e.g. regarding the potential role of load shifting
for reducing congestion [9], the integration of renewables by
reducing curtailment [11], or the distributional impacts of public
policies via the power price [17].
This said, several qualifications are in order. First, alternative
approaches are possible. Thus, as Cartea and Gonzalez-Pedraz [8]
point out, the owner of an interconnector has the right, but not the
Fig. 10. Histogram of simulated hourly price gaps between Spain and France (2020e2022).
Table 12
Simulated 3-year income (million V) from cross-border power flows: zero price
growth.
10% percentile Mean 90% percentile
Exports (S/F) 18 (32) 40 (27) 105 (94)
Imports (F/S) 333 (773) 462 (964) 600 (1166)
L.M. Abadie and J.M. Chamorro Energy 233 (2021) 121177obligation, to transmit power between two markets. Therefore,
once it has been built, the financial value of an interconnector is
given by a series of real options written on the spread between the
power prices in these markets.
Regarding prices, policy measures to promote variable renew-
able generation sometimes interfere with cross-border trade by
distorting price formation in domestic markets; Bahar and Sauvage
[29].18 Further, differences in support schemes in the inter-
connected countries and/or the way they deal with negative prices
can give rise to artificial differences between their wholesale prices.
From a quantity-based viewpoint, the further deployment of
renewable technologies calls for expanded cross-border connec-
tions (to avoid congestion of the interconnectors and the ensuing
loss of cross-border capacity available to market participants). Even
when sizeable portions of aggregate congestion arise in specific
regions, international cooperation turns out to be valuable for
congestion management; Kunz and Zerrahn [30]. As a matter or
circularity, cross-border power trade in turn has a significant and
positive impact on the effective capacity factor of wind parks, for
example; OECD [31].
In addition, different national approaches to the role of inter-
mittent generators in balancing responsibilities can leave their
mark on cross-border electricity trade. Another issue that goes
beyond technical aspects has to do with unscheduled power flows.
According to Kunz [15]; they are a by-product of the European
approach to congestion management. National market18 Other generating technologies too receive direct and/or indirect forms of sup-
port, which can similarly distort price formation.
13arrangements can also have an impact on cross-border trade,
among them: gate-closure times (before the real-time dispatch of
electricity),19 the rules and design of power markets, auctions, and
transmission fees.
We leave these issues aside. Nevertheless, the implications for
policy makers are clear: if an efficient, integrated European power
market is ever to exist, then it is necessary to advance in common
toward a greater harmonization on a number of dimensions.
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